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4Abstract
Analysis of the wage gap has most usually been carried out across the 
formal sector as a whole, missing nuances of differences in pay in spe-
cific occupations. This paper analyzes data from a new survey of firms 
and workers in the textiles and clothing sector collected in 2009. These 
data allow for the explanation of the sector’s gender wage gap by poorer 
endowments, relegation of women to low–paying firms and occupations, 
and by within-firm and within-occupation differential in returns. There 
is a pay gap in this sector, with men receiving an hourly wage 29 percent 
higher than that of women. This gap arises partly as women are concen-
trated in the lower paid occupations and the lower-paying firms. There 
is clear glass ceiling in effect with women least represented in the high-
est paying management positions.  Somewhat surprisingly, differences in 
returns favor women, and the intra-occupational pay gap is reversed once 
characteristics, including firm characteristics, are controlled for. Failure to 
control for firm characteristics (as in most studies) will over-estimate the 
gap. Outright discrimination is the sole reason for discrimination within 
the sector and could be partially explained by the difference between 
the role society expects of men and that it expects of women, the for-
mer being the main bread earner.  The largest of the pay gap (more than 
70 percent)is attributable to differences in endowments, such as worker 
education and experience. Thus, closing the pay gap is not just a matter 
of equal pay for equal work, as is now being discussed in Egypt, but of 
enhancing women’s capabilities to ensure equality of opportunity upon 
entering the labor force.
1. Introduction
Textiles and clothing play an important role in Egypt’s economy, 
notably their contribution to employment, value added, and foreign 
exchange earnings. Textile and clothing enterprises account for one-fifth 
of all industrial sector firms, being the largest single employer with over 
400,000 workers, that is almost a quarter of the industrial labor force 
(Industrial Development Authority 2009). In 2008 the industry accounted 
for 26.4 percent of industrial production with a total value added of LE 
33.5 billion (Ministry of State for Economic Development (MOED) 2008), 
and close to 10 percent of the country’s exports (International Trade 
Centre 2008). The government has long utilized this sector to absorb 
5Egypt’s growing labor force and help tackle unemployment problems and 
generate incomes for about half a million Egyptian families. The growth 
of the sector was hoped to move workers from the informal sector with 
worse, less secure, working conditions and low returns.
As of the late 1990s, the TC sector has increasingly attracted female 
workers. Increasing employment was a consequence of the growing 
private sector, both as public firms were privatized or more specifically 
neglected (El-Haddad 2010), but more particularly from the entry of new 
private firms in the newly liberalized economic environment following the 
adoption of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program 
(ERSAP) in 1991. In fact the entire increase in private sector employment 
between 1998 and 2006 was on account of the feminization of these two 
sectors (Assaad and El-Hamidi 2009). Many more women are employed in 
TC compared to the average national level: at the national level in 2007 
just under 20% (just over 20%) of the private sector (overall) labor force 
were women whereas in textiles and clothing (TC) this share doubles to 
about 40%. 
However, labor intensive industries, especially those producing for the 
export market, have often been criticized for providing only low wage 
employment, especially for women. So can the TC sector in Egypt be 
expected to yield a living wage, especially for women who are either in 
lower paid occupations or suffer from wage discrimination? To answer 
this question, this paper examines the gender wage gap in Egypt’s TC 
sector. Specifically, the paper analyzes data from a new survey of firms 
and workers in the TC sector collected in 2009.  These data allow for 
the explanation of the sector’s gender wage gap by poorer endowments, 
relegation of women to low–paying firms and occupations and by within-
firm and within-occupation differential in returns. These results are 
presented as a Oaxaca decomposition controlling for both worker and 
firm characteristics.
The paper is divided into four sections. The second presents data and 
methodology employed in this paper. Results are discussed in the third 
section of the paper. The fourth section concludes. 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data Sources
Two new data sets-a firm questionnaire covering 275 TC firms and 
a worker questionnaire covering 5,383 TC workers-were collected in 
September, 2009.1 This paper uses the latter.  The following two sections 
briefly describe the questionnaire and sampling design.
1      The survey was conducted by the Cabinet’s Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC).
62.1.1 Firm Level Survey
The firm survey comprised six modules: basic firm data, firm activity, 
production, sales, exports and employment, trends after the financial 
crisis, job opportunities, and future plans. Table 1 gives a breakdown of 
sampled firms. 
Firms were sampled based on a combination of two sample frames 
provided by the Egyptian Federation of Industries.2 Unfortunately, the 
final frame does not reflect the true number of firms in the TC industry 
in Egypt. There simply is not any comprehensive, accurate and detailed 
frame that includes basic firm level data to ensure a representative sample. 
The 275 firms covered the governorates of Greater Cairo, Alexandria and 
El-Sharkyia; these three include more than 90 percent of Egypt’s TC 
firms. Greater Cairo comprises the governorates of Cairo, Giza, 6th of 
October, Helwan and El-Qalyubia. 
Stratified sampling was used to ensure sufficient representation of 
large sized and exporting firms. The resulting geographical distribution of 
sampled firms was very similar to that in the sample frame (Table 1). Tables 
2 and 3 give a breakdown of sampled firms by activity, market orientation, 
ownership and firm size.
Table 1: Sample Firm Distribution by Location 
No. & % of firms in the sample No. & % of firms in sample frame
Greater Cairo 181 66% 820 70%
Alexandria 60 22% 253 22%
El-Sharkyia 34 12% 99 8%
275 100% 1172 100%
Source: Author’s calculation based on Egyptian Federation of Industries Sample Frame and IDSC Sampling Design.
Table 2: Sample Firm Distribution by Activity, Market Orientation and Ownership
Activity Market Orientation Ownership
Textiles Clothing Exporting
Non-
exporting
Public 
sector
Private 
sector
Total
QIZ Non-QIZ
No. of 
firms
97 178 53 40 182 6 169 275
% 35% 65% 19% 15% 66% 2% 98% 100%
Source: IDSC TC Firm Questionnaire (2009). 
2      This means that firms in the informal sector are excluded.
7Table 3: Sample Firm Distribution by Firm Size* 
Small Medium Large Total
No. of firms in the 
sample
125 115 35 275
% 45% 42% 13% 100%
Share in real 
weighted 
production
5% 10% 85% 100%
Source: IDSC TC Firm Questionnaire 2009. *Small firms: up to 50 workers, medium: greater than 50 and up to 500 
workers, and large: over 500 workers.
2.1.2 Worker Survey
The worker questionnaire was divided into five modules: basic 
characteristics, work conditions, skills and training, job satisfaction, and 
crisis effects. The sample was stratified by four size categories: less than 10 
workers, from 10 to 100, from 100 to 1,000, and larger than 1,000 workers 
(Table 4); 5,590 workers were to be surveyed however, due to practical 
problems in the field, only 5,383 questionnaires were completed.
Table 4: Sample Worker Distribution 
Firm category
(no. of workers)
No. of sampled 
firms (1)
No. of workers 
sampled from each 
firm in category (2)
No. of sampled 
workers in category
(3) = (1)*(2)
Less than 10 100 5 500
10-100 101 20 2,020
Greater than100-
1,000
63 40 2,520
More than 1,000 11 50 550
Total 275 5,590
Source: IDSC Worker Survey Sampling Note (2009).  
2.2 Sample Descriptives
2.2.1 Sector Employment by Gender
This analysis covers only permanent public and private sector workers, 
which are non- seasonal and non- part-time workers, reducing the sample 
to 5,200 workers. Women are known to be heavily concentrated in the 
TC sector. Indeed, many more women are employed in TC compared to 
the average national level. At the national level just under 20% (just over 
820%) of the private sector (overall) labor force are females whereas in 
textiles and clothing (TC) this share doubles to about 40% (Table 5). As of 
the late 1990s, two sectors increasingly attracted female workers, namely 
food processing and textiles and clothing. In fact, the entire increase in 
private sector employment between 1998 and 2006 was on account of the 
feminization of these two sectors (Assaad and El-Hamidi 2009).
Table 5: National and Sample TC Employment by Gender (2007, 2009) 
Employment in TC National Employment
Sample IDSC 2009
CAPMAS 2007 (in millions) 
Public + Private Private Sector
Male 3,243 17.1 12.6
62% 78% 81%
Female 1,957 4,7 2.9
38% 22% 19%
Total
5,200 21.8 15.5
100% 100% 100%
Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), Annual Statistical Book, Various issues. 
IDSC TC Worker Questionnaire 2009.
Compared to the sector data, at the national level the distribution 
of men and women in the sample is closer to that of the private sector, 
so whilst women represent 38% of all TC workers in the sample they 
represent just a quarter (26%) in overall sector employment at the national 
level (Table 6). But the share is close to that of the private sector (34%). 
This is hardly surprising since most public sector firms are textiles firms 
rather than clothing firms. Clothing firms are more likely to hire larger 
numbers of women than men, especially for their relatively substantial 
sewing activity.
Table 6: TC National and Sample Employment by Gender (2007, 2009) 
Sample IDSC 2009 CAPMAS 2006
Public + Private Private Sector
Male 3,243 206,421 115,315
62% 74% 66%
Female 1,957 71,846 58,446
38% 26% 34%
Total 5,200 278,267 173,761
100% 100% 100%
Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), Annual Statistical Book, Various issues. 
IDSC TC Worker Questionnaire 2009.
9According to the sample, most women working in the sector are 
relatively young (average age of 28 compared to 36 for men) and unmarried 
(62%) (Table 7). Men have attained relatively higher educational levels 
compared to women (Table 8); 15% of all sampled men have a university 
or post-university degree compared to only 9% of all women. These 
differences in education reflect the disproportionate hiring of men at 
more senior levels, as discussed below.
Table 7: Marital Status by Gender 
Men Women Total
Unmarried
845 1,220 2,065
26% 62%
Married
2,398 737 3,135
74% 38%
Total
3,243 1,957 5,200
100% 100%
Source: Author’s calculations based on IDSC TC Worker Questionnaire 2009.
Table 8: Educational Attainment by Gender 
Men Women Total
Illiterate
Frequency 314 208 522
Share of all men (women) 9% 10% 10%
Read & Write
Frequency 1,136 752 1,888
Share of all men (women) 34% 37% 35%
Secondary & 
Postsecondary
Frequency 1,391 881 2,272
Share of all men (women) 41% 44% 42%
University & 
Post University
Frequency 517 184 701
Share of all men (women) 15% 9% 13%
Total
Frequency 3,358 2,025 5,383
Share of all men (women) 100% 100% 100%
Source: Author’s calculations based on IDSC TC Worker Questionnaire 2009.
2.2.2 Sample Gender and Wage Distribution by Occupation
The distribution of men and women into the various occupations along 
the TC occupational structure shows a degree of occupational segregation. 
Men are disproportionately represented in the upper, more powerful 
professions, such as supervisors, managers, executives, and production 
operators (Table 7). On the other hand, women tend to be over-represented 
in the lowest-ranking, lowest-paid occupations in the workforce, such 
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as secretaries, sewing machine operators, and sales associates. That is, 
occupations are “sex typed” as either being specifically male or female 
jobs. Unsurprisingly, the largest single occupation, accounting for 56% of 
all workers, is factory workers. Nearly half of all men (47%) occupy this 
category whilst for women the figure is 71%.
 
Table 7: Sample Occupation Breakdown by Gender and Gender Breakdown by Occupation Men Women Total
Managerial Positions (e.g. executives, supervisors, production operators) (1)
Frequency 183 52 235
Gender share in occupation (%) 78 22 100
Share of all men (women) (%) 5.6 2.7 4.5
Specialists (“those holding scientific positions”, e.g. engineers) (2)
Frequency 239 60 299
Gender share in occupation (%) 80 20 100
Share of all men (women) (%) 7.4 3.1 5.8
Specialists› helpers and technicians (3)
Frequency 444 50 494
Gender share in occupation (%) 90 10 100
Share of all men (women) (%) 13.7 2.6 9.5
Office administrative positions (4)
Frequency 154 79 233
Gender share in occupation (%) 66 34 100
Share of all men (women) (%) 4.8 4.0 4.5
Workers in services, in shops and markets(e.g. sellers of clothing) (5)
Frequency 29 6 35
Gender share in occupation (%) 83 17 100
Share of all men (women) (%) 0.9 0.3 0.7
Handicraftsmen (7)
Frequency 386 252 638
Gender share in occupation (%) 61 40 100
Share of all men (women) (%) 12 13 12
Factory workers, machinery workers and assembly workers (8)
Frequency 1,519 1,383 2,902
Gender share in occupation (%) 52 48 100
Share of all men (women) (%) 47 71 56
continued u
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Ordinary workers (e.g. maids, cleaners, office boys…etc.) (9)
Frequency 289 75 364
Gender share in occupation (%) 79 21 100
Share of all men (women) (%) 9 4 7
Total 3,243 1,957 5,200
62% 38% 100
Source: IDSC Worker Questionnaire, 2009. Occupation codes in brackets. Codes utilized here follow the Standard 
Occupational Classification Manual (2005) (IDSC, Ministry for Labor Force and Immigration, Social Fund for 
Development, CAPMAS, National Committee for data Review and Auditing, 2005). 
Table 8 gives the average hourly wage for each occupation in the sample. 
The higher the occupational code, the lower the occupational status and 
the lower the wage rate. So whilst the average hourly wage reaches about 
six (LE5.61) Egyptian pounds for management positions, it drops by 60% 
to just above two pounds (LE2.24) for office boys and cleaners.
Table 8: Log Hourly and Hourly Wage by Occupation (in LE)
Log Hourly Wage Hourly Wage
Managerial Positions (e.g. executives, supervisors, 
production operators) (1)
1.62 5.61
Specialists (“those holding scientific positions”, e.g. 
engineers) (2)
1.31 4.33
Specialists› helpers and technicians (3) 1.14 3.48
Office administrative positions (4) 1.04 3.10
Workers in services, in shops and markets(e.g. sellers 
of clothing) (5)
1.05 3.16
Handicraftsmen (7) 1.02 3.14
Factory workers, machinery workers and assembly 
workers (8)
0.85 2.55
Ordinary workers (e.g. maids, cleaners, office boys...etc.) (9) 0.73 2.24
Total 0.96 2.96
Source: IDSC Worker Questionnaire, 2009. Note on occupational codes as in Table 7 above. 
Figure 1 shows an increasing trend for females’ share into lower paying 
occupations, whereas the opposite is the case for men (of course, as it is 
the opposite side of the same coin). Accordingly, the distribution of men 
and women along the TC occupational structure – before controlling for 
characteristics - supports the glass ceiling hypothesis. This hypothesis 
argues that women are stopped at a lower level within the hierarchy of 
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an organization due to discrimination. The ceiling or barrier preventing 
women from advancing is believed to be not immediately apparent and 
is usually an unwritten and unofficial or informal policy hence, the term 
glass (i.e. transparent and so can’t be seen, that is, it is not written down 
anywhere). 
The first three occupations (1, 2 and 3) represent the stereotypically 
“male jobs”, in which 80%-90% of the workers are men (Table 7 above, 
Figure1). Average wages in these three occupations are higher than those 
in occupations 7 and 8, in which 40% and 48% of the jobholders are 
women (compared to 38% of all occupations). This segregation of women 
into less-prestigious and lower-paid jobs decreases a woman’s opportunity 
for promotion, as well as her chance of having any type of substantial 
management function over other employees. 
Figure 1: Share in Occupational Categories by Gender
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Source: IDSC Worker Questionnaire, 2009. Note on occupational codes as in Table 7 above. 
Figure 2 also shows that occupation(s) with the most women has (have) 
nearly the lowest hourly average wage and that occupation(s) with the 
highest average wage have a small share of women.
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Figure 2: Female Share in Occupational Category against Hourly Wage
Source: Author’s calculations based on IDSC Worker Questionnaire, 2009. Note on occupational codes as in Table 7 above.
But are women discriminated against in pay within each occupational 
category? Figure 3 depicts the distribution of hourly wages across 
occupations by gender. The figure shows that women earn systematically 
lower hourly wages than men in every single occupational category. Figure 
4 shows that women are least concentrated in occupations with nearly 
identical hourly wage (e.g. occupation 3). The largest difference in pay is in 
the professionals and specialists’ category (occupation 2) where women’s 
share represents only 20%. Table 9 gives the same information.
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Figure 3: Hourly Wage Distribution by Gender and Occupation   (in LE)
Source: Author’s calculations based on IDSC Worker Questionnaire, 2009. 
Figure 4: Share in Occupational Wage Categories by Gender & Hourly Wage
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Source: Author’s calculations based on IDSC Worker Questionnaire, 2009. 
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Table 9: Hourly Wages: Mean, Standard Deviation, and Frequency by Occupation and 
Gender
Occupation Men Women Total
Managerial Positions (e.g. executives, 
supervisors, production operators) (1)
Hourly Wages in LE 5.76 5.1 5.61
SD 3.21 1.78 2.96
Frequency 183 52 235
Specialists (“those holding scientific 
positions”, e.g. engineers( (2)
Hourly Wages in LE 4.69 2.9 4.33
SD 3.23 1.33 3.04
Frequency 239 60 299
Specialists› helpers and 
technicians(3)
Hourly Wages in LE 3.49 3.36 3.48
SD 1.84 2.02 1.86
Frequency 444 50 494
Office administrative positions (4)
Hourly Wages in LE 3.32 2.68 3.1
SD 1.91 0.99 1.68
Frequency 154 79 233
Workers in services, in shops and 
markets(e.g. sellers of clothing) (5)
Hourly Wages in LE 3.33 2.37 3.16
SD 1.46 0.41 1.38
Frequency 29 6 35
Handicraftsmen (7)
Hourly Wages in LE 3.53 2.55 3.14
SD 1.99 1.23 1.8
Frequency 386 252 638
Factory workers, machinery workers 
and assembly workers (8)
Hourly Wages in LE 2.83 2.25 2.55
SD 1.17 0.9 1.09
Frequency 1519 1383 2902
Ordinary workers(e.g. maids, 
cleaners, office boys...etc.) (9)
Hourly Wages in LE 2.34 1.87 2.24
SD 0.9 0.72 0.89
Frequency 289 75 364
Total
3.29 2.42 2.96
 1.97 1.15 1.76
 3243 1957 5200
Source: Author’s calculations based on IDSC Worker Questionnaire, 2009. Note on occupational codes as in Table 
7 above. 
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2.2.3 Sample Gender and Wage Distribution by Firm Characteristics 
Exporting firms hire relatively more women (Table 10: 41%) compared 
to non-exporting firms (34%). These firms also have a lower hourly wage 
gap: the gap is LE2.32 for non- exporting firms but only 67 piasters for 
exporting firms, i.e. one third of that of non-exporting firms (Table 11). 
This finding is consistent with evidence from India showing that the wage 
gap is less in sectors with a greater export orientation (Reilly and Dutta, 
2005).Using German firm-level data, Heinze and Wolf (2009) also find 
a smaller wage gap in firms that export more. Assaad has even spoken 
of a “reverse wage gap” in export sectors which heavily demand female 
labor (Population Reference Bureau 2008). However, this is not a universal 
rule, as Seguino reported a persistent wage gap despite substantial export 
growth in South Korea (1997), the same being argued for East Asia in 
general by Zveglich and Rodgers (2004). 
With respect to size, the pay gap is wider in medium and large firms 
compared to small firms (Table 12). But larger firms also pay higher wages, 
so in absolute terms both men and women are better paid in these firms 
(this is of course before controlling for characteristics).
Table 10: Distribution of Employees by Firms’ Market Orientation
Men Women Total
Non-exporting
1,597 829 2,426
66% 34% 100%
Exporting
1,646 1,128 2,774
59% 41% 100%
Total
3,243 1,957 5,200
62% 38% 100%
Source: Author’s calculations based on IDSC Worker Questionnaire, 2009. Note on occupational codes as in Table 
7 above. 
Table 11: Mean Hourly Wage by Gender and Firms’ Market Orientation (in LE)
Men Women Hourly Wage Gap 
Non-Exporting 4.87 2.55 2.32
Exporting 3.57 2.9 0.67
Source: Author’s calculations. Sampling weights used.
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Table 12: Mean Gender Hourly Wage Gap by Firm Size (in LE)
 Men Women Hourly Wage Gap
Small: 0   ≤ 50 worker    2.81 2.22 0.59
Medium: 50 ≤ 150           3.6 2.47 1.13
Large   > 150         3.99 2.95 1.04
Source: Author’s calculations. Sampling weights used.
2.2.4 Employer’s Gender Preference 
When asked if they preferred a particular gender to work in their 
firm provided both had the same educational attainment and skill level, 
35% of employers (97 employers of a total of 275) stated that they do. Of 
these, over a half claimed they prefer men (54%) the top reason being the 
difficulty of the task required of them (25% of those who prefer men), the 
second reason being men’s lower rate of absenteeism (22%).
When asked whether the average monthly wage differs between men 
and women who possess the same level of education and years of experience 
and are in the same occupation, only 16% of all employers agreed that it 
does. Nearly all of these respondents argued the preference was in favor of 
men (96%). Again, the difference in tasks required of each sex topped the 
list of reasons for the difference (34 firms, 76% of these firms) followed by 
higher productivity for men (19 firms, 42%) and then the lesser number of 
hours worked per month by women compared to men (17 firms, 38%), and 
finally female workers taking more leave (12 firms, 27%).
The following analysis will control for difference in worker and firm 
characteristics between men and women in order to judge the source of 
pay differences between them.
  
2.3 Background 
Gender pay discrimination has been tackled theoretically via two 
distinct methodologies: direct and indirect. Following Oaxaca (1973), 
traditional wage equations can be decomposed to show how differences 
in wages can be attributed to differences in personal attributes or 
skills, plus discrimination due to gender-differentiated returns to those 
characteristics, and a residual pure discrimination effect. 
This approach has been criticized for suffering from selection bias as it 
does not control for selection of labor market participants into the labor 
force and into the sectors and occupations they currently hold. Precisely, 
exclusion of non-participants in the labor force from the OLS wage 
regression equation, provided the participation decision is systematic, 
18
renders the pool of studied employees non-random and accordingly, 
results in biased estimates (Heckman 1979; Maddala 1983). This problem 
can be overcome by performing a double selection model (Heckman 1979; 
Maddala 1983) where a further correction term for selection – calculated 
from a first stage participation equation – is added as a regressor to 
the earnings or the wage equation (cf. El-Hamidi and Said, 2008). The 
Oaxaca approach has also been criticized as the OLS residuals in the wage 
equations are assumed to have zero means, however, the expectation of 
the error term at a given quantile (along the wage distribution) need not 
be zero. Approaches analyzing gender wage discrimination at quantiles 
include that introduced by Gardeazabel and Ugidos (2005). Kandil (2009) 
has applied this technique to explore changes in the gender wage gap at 
the aggregate level in Egypt over three years (1988, 1998 and 2006). Rica 
et al. (2003) also explored the Spanish gender wage gap utilizing a quantile 
analysis. 
The traditional Oaxaca-Blinder approach has increasingly been 
replaced by other methods. First, an analysis of whether discrimination is 
evident within the same establishment or firm utilizing a range of models, 
such as multilevel modeling and random effects on matched employer-
employee data (cf. Peterson and Morgan 1995; Groshen 1991; Cardoso 
2000; Gupta and Rothstein 2001; Meyersson-Milgrom et al. 2001; Bayrad 
2003; Korkeamäki and Kyyrä 2005; Ilkkaracan and Selim 2007; Heinze 
and Wolf 2009). However, these studies are limited in number due to 
their demanding data requirements, there being only a handful of such 
studies even for the U.S. (Council of Economic Advisers, 1998) though this 
has been recently changing. The second approach measures male versus 
female productivity in order to link differences in pay to productivity. 
This approach is rarely implemented because of its even greater data 
requirements.
Indirect methodologies have most usually been applied in developed 
country research. This approach utilizes (field) experiments to prove 
discrimination by, for instance, sending out identical resumes with male 
and female names as job applications and thus discovering discrimination 
(cf. Petit 2007; see also same methodology applied to racial discrimination: 
Pager, Western, and Bonikowski 2009). A field experiment in the U.S. 
has been conducted by concealing the identity of symphony orchestra 
candidates from their audition juries. As a result chances of hiring female 
musicians have noticeably increased in such competitions (ibid.). Other 
studies have undertaken laboratory experiments (e.g. Andreoni and Petrie 
2008).
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2.4 Methodology
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, log hourly wages are 
estimated for both men and women using the classical least squares model. 
Second, a traditional Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is performed based 
on these estimates. Oaxaca decomposition reveals whether differences in 
pay between men and women are due to differing characteristics between 
them or alternatively, due to discrimination (unjustified difference). 
Discrimination is present if pay differs for men and women with the same 
characteristics. The novel aspect of this analysis is that it combines both 
worker and firm data sets and hence, controlling for personal worker 
attributes but also firm and occupational attributes. Controlling for the 
latter is expected to reduce the discrimination effect although it may 
introduce other types of discrimination; that is, discrimination at the 
entry point for the various sectors of the economy, occupations within any 
one sector, and into particular types of firms. As a sectoral study, this study 
is able to quantitatively identify segregation or entry barriers of women to 
the last two, i.e. to certain firms and to certain occupations within a certain 
sector (here TC) but not into sectors, such as agriculture, industry or 
services, and then into subsectors within these (e.g. food industry, textiles 
and clothing, chemicals…etc.). Due to lack of data, performing a Heckman 
double selection correction model to control for selection into the labor 
force and into sectors is not possible. Controlling for self-selection depends 
on women’s opportunity cost  of  time, and so will usually depend on a 
woman’s family social background, her unearned income (or that of her 
household), her household’s assets, and the employment status of males 
in her household. All these household-related variables are unfortunately 
unavailable in the datasets at hand. Nevertheless, at least selection into 
occupations within TC will be performed as a further extension to the 
paper at hand.
 
2.4.1 Mathematical Representation
Discrimination against women in the labor market exists when the 
ratio of the mean male and female wages does not equal the wage ratio 
in the absence of discrimination: WmWf≠Wm0Wf, where Wm0Wf  is 
the ratio in the absence of discrimination, and WmWf is the observed 
male/female ratio (Oaxaca 1973). However, Wm0Wf  is unobserved 
and so the observed wage difference is decomposed into two parts: a 
difference based on individual productivity traits (justified difference) and 
a difference based on market returns to those traits (unjustified difference 
or discrimination) (Borjas and Ramey, 2000).
Thus, for the purposes of estimating the male-female wage differential, 
the population regression line is given by:
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lnwi =β0i+β1ix1i+β2ix2i+εi                      (1)
Where:
lnwi = logarithmic hourly wage
x1i   = vector of worker personal attributes
x2i   = vector of firm and occupation attributes 
i       = m for male workers, f for female workers
βji   = associated vector of coefficients
j      = 1, 2
εi     = additive error term
The vector of worker personal attributes includes age, age squared, 
marital status and education level. Firm attributes include firm size, its 
market orientation, be it exporting or not, years of experience required 
by the firm for that particular occupation, and firm location (given by 
governorate) to control for differences in living standards across regions. 
An ownership variable to explore the possibility of different wages between 
Egyptian and foreign firms is also added to this vector. 
The fitted lines take the following form: 
Decomposition Analysis
Mean difference between male and female wages is given by the 
following difference equation, which is the subtraction of equation (3) 
from (2): 
The second and third terms of equation (5) capture the allocation or 
share effect attributing part of the gender gap to difference in endowments 
(2)
(3)
(4)
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between sample men and women. Endowments range from personal 
attributes (i.e. age, marital status and education level) to firm attributes (i.e. 
size, export status, required years of experience and ownership) and type 
of occupation workers are allocated to (i.e. ranging from occupations 1 to 9 
as listed above). The last two terms of the equation capture discrimination 
or difference in returns to endowments between male and female workers. 
Finally, the first term signifies pure or outright discrimination between men 
and women, that is, the wage gap between men and women having allowed 
for their different characteristics and returns to those characteristics.
3. Results
3.1 Wage Equation Regression Results
Table 13 presents regression results from 4 different specifications. Each 
specification is presented three times: on the pooled data set, and separately 
for men and women. The pure discrimination term (the coefficient on the 
sex variable in the pooled regression) is robustly significant, with a fairly 
stable coefficient across specifications. However it is lower in more fully 
specified models (regressions (3) and (4)) which include additional firm 
characteristics such as size, so papers ignoring those characteristics may 
overstate discrimination within firms. 
3.1.1 Occupational Characteristics
Log hourly wages for most categories are quite similar once 
characteristics such as education are controlled for. However, two 
occupational categories depart from this norm. Managers (occupation 
category (1)) receive significantly higher wages compared to the reference 
category (occupation category (5): workers in services, in shops and markets, 
e.g. sellers of clothing) and office boys/girls (occupation category (9): 
ordinary positions) receive significantly less. In addition the “management 
premium” is quite a bit higher for women than men, i.e. compared to men 
women receive a larger incremental rise in hourly wages when climbing up 
the occupation structure from occupational category (5) to (1). 
3.1.2 Personal Attributes
Significant increases in hourly wages accrue to both males and females 
as they attain more advanced stages of education, namely secondary and 
post-secondary education, and university and post-university education, 
though the incremental increase is slightly lower for women employees. 
The coefficient on age is highly significant and stable. With sample mean 
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age for males of 36 years and of only 28 for their female counterparts, it is 
expected that the share or endowment effect will be substantial for this 
regressor. 
Although not significant, it is worth noting that marital status is 
positive for men and negative for women. This may be due to differences 
in productivity levels. It is customary that women in Egypt are motivated, 
efficient and productive before marriage but that this changes with 
marriage and children. In relatively male dominated societies such 
as Egypt, working women are still expected to carry out all household 
responsibilities, hence crippling their performance at work, which in 
turn exercises downward pressure on their wages. At the extreme, once 
married, most women in this sector do not desire to work any longer or 
feel that they will be unable to do so (Assaad and El Hamidi 2009). This 
is because most of the female workers in the sector are young, unmarried3 
secondary school graduates who still live with their parents. Their main 
reason to work is to prepare themselves for marriage and to financially 
assist their parents (ibid.), with marriage this reason no longer holds. In 
Islamic societies men are expected to financially provide for the family. 
Hence, another explanation for the opposing signs for the coefficient 
on marital status may be employers’ belief that married men need more 
money than unmarried women.
3.1.3 Firm Attributes
Despite a lower gender pay wage gap in exporting firms (see Sample 
Descriptives section above), wages in these firms are significantly lower 
than those in non-exporting firms once characteristics are controlled for. 
All characteristics’ hourly wages are significantly lower for employees of 
exporting firms compared to non-exporters.4 The difference in wages 
between exporters and non-exporters is larger for men than it is for 
women. Producers for the domestic market compete with each other 
but in a still largely protected market,5 but exporting firms compete in 
alargely competitive international market and so hourly wages reflect this 
fact.  Exporters have been divided into qualifying industrial zones (QIZ) 
exporters and non-QIZ ones, but the results are essentially the same and 
3     As shown by the means of these variables presented earlier.
4     This slightly contradicts the findings of Al Azzawi and Said (2009) that wages in industries with a higher 
share of exports are higher.
5     This is because most favored nation tariff (MFN) rates on the imports of TC are non-zero. Currently MFN tar-
iffs on yarns range between 0-5%, fabrics 0-10% and tariffs on carpets and other textile floor coverings, clothes 
and home textiles are generally in the neighborhood of 30% (Presidential Decrees 2000, 2004 and 2007). These 
rates are in full accordance with Egypt’s WTO commitments. Indeed, in most cases these rates are below their 
WTO bound rates (El-Haddad 2010).
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the F-test allows the combination of these categories into one (that is 
exporting, see more elaborate specifications in Annex 1). 
Adding firm size substantially improves the results (regressions 3 and 
4). Regression 3 uses size as a categorical variable whilst regression 4 
uses dummies for three firm sizes: small (0<50 workers), medium (50 ≤ 
150 workers) and large (>150 workers) since the categories could not be 
combined according to an F test. Medium sized firms pay higher wages 
in general (log LE 0.1333 higher than small firms), and larger firms pay 
even higher (0.272 higher). However, for women the incremental increase 
is much higher for large firms compared to medium ones (regression (4): 
0.238 compared to only 0.075). The ownership variable is never significant, 
possibly due to multicollinearity with the export and size variables. This, 
together with the joint F-test, makes regression (4) the best specification 
for this data set. Experience dummies have the right signs but are almost 
always significant for men but not for women, most likely as just under 
90% (87%) of women join firms and occupations that require little or 
no experience compared to 78% for men.6 Alexandria governorate pays 
significantly lower wages compared to Al Sharkeya, the reference category, 
but also compared to Greater Cairo. 
6     This is because tasks like sewing, where women are concentrated, need less training.
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3.2 Decomposition Results
In the TC industry women receive 22% lower log hourly wages than 
men, in other words they receive only 78% of the hourly wage men 
receive in the industry.7 A substantial part of this gap (72%) is explained by 
differences in women’s personal endowments compared to men’s (Figure 
5); sampled women are relatively younger and less educated than men in 
the sample (refer to Annex 2 for descriptives of all regression variables). 
One-fifth of the gap (19%) is attributable to women being employed in 
low paying firms and occupations; those requiring little or no experience 
(see preceding section above). and to them being relegated to exporting; 
smaller sized firms, where everyone makes less money. The concentration 
of females in these types of firms and occupations could also be regarded as 
“indirect or concealed discrimination,” but at the entry point. Even though 
such entry barriers are justified by endowments, it is these endowments 
that constitute what Roemer (1998) calls “inequality of opportunity” which 
are [partly] created by what he calls “circumstances,” such as racial and 
family background, which the individual should not be held accountable 
for from a social justice perspective. Hence, it is the endowments that 
need to be enhanced for females in the sector to climb to the top of the 
occupational ladder. Two factors, namely females’ personal attributes and 
their allocation to low paying firms and occupations, together explain 
over 90% of the gap (Table 14). Note that the data set does not include 
information on “circumstances” and so cannot quantify how much of the 
endowments and allocation is due to “circumstances” and how much is 
due to “effort.”8 Hence, further rigorous analysis is required.
Only 9% of the gap is attributable to discrimination. This low figure 
results from two counteracting tendencies. Women are actually favored 
in terms of returns to firms’ characteristics and occupations, as well as 
personal characteristics. That is, women with the same characteristics as 
men receivehigher pay, and the intra-occupational pay gap is reversed once 
characteristics are controlled for (-0.16 and -0.17 log hourly LE respectively). 
Thus, outright discrimination is the sole reason for discrimination and 
could be partially explained by the difference between the role society 
expects of men and that it expects of women, the former being the main 
bread earner.  This explanation is in line with the tradition of women’s 
wages being “pin money,” that is for women’s own petty expenses. This 
view is not confined to Arab or Muslim societies. Evidence from OECD 
countries suggests that perceptions of women’s role as homemakers, which 
are likely formed in youth and linked to religious ideology, have persisted 
7     Note that this gap is expressed in log terms, the actual gap in absolute Egyptian pounds amounts to 29%.
8     More precisely “effort” beyond an individual’s group or type average effort level. This is so since Roemer 
divides individuals to types of similar circumstances (Roemer 1998).
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over time (Fortin 2005).  Note that this is the perception of the employer 
as much as it is that of the woman herself, and her personal expectation of 
what (pay) she deserves. A study on Israeli men and women has shown that 
complacency regarding wages is more prevalent among more traditional 
and religious women than among “modern” women. The former turn to 
low status, female-typed occupations, and prefer to work in part-time 
jobs (Moore 2006). In developing Asia, particularly South Asia, gender 
gaps remain significant across the labor market. A recent survey of the 
empirical literature suggests this persistence of gender inequality is caused 
and reinforced by interlinked cultural, social, and economic factors (Nimii 
2009). It could also be explained by a trend toward gender equality in which 
employers want to employ women, and since women are less qualified, 
end up giving equal pay to women who are less qualified than their male 
counterparts. However, there is not yet any equal pay legislation in force 
in Egypt. The plausibility of both these explanations requires further 
research.
Figure 5: Log Hourly Wage Gap Decomposition
Source: Author’s calculations based on IDSC Worker Questionnaire, 2009. 
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Table 14: Full Decomposition of the Log Hourly Gender Gap (lnwm-lnwf)
in log LE % of Gap
Discrimination
Pure discrimination 0.36 105%
Difference in returns to personal characteristics -0.16 -47%
Difference in returns to occupation and to firm 
characteristics -0.17 -48%
Discrimination Total 0.03 9%
Difference in Endowments 
(in characteristics, firms and occupations)
Personal attributes 0.25 72%
Occupational and firm attributes 0.06 19%
Endowment Total 0.31 91%
Total Hourly Wage Gap 0.34 100%
Source: Author’s calculations based on IDSC Worker Questionnaire, 2009. 
4. Conclusions
There is a 29 % gender wage gap in the textiles and clothing sector in 
Egypt. The analysis presented in this paper attributes the largest portion 
of this gap (72 percent) to differences in endowments between men and 
women. Most of the remaining gap (19 percent) is accounted for by women’s 
relegation to low paying occupations and lower-paying firms. In particular, 
there is a clear glass ceiling in effect, in which women are significantly 
under-represented in the highest-paying management positions.
Only 9 percent of the gap is explained by what is usually classified as 
discrimination. The differences in returns in fact favor women. That is, 
women with identical characteristics as men receive higher pay, and the 
intra-occupational pay gap is reversed once characteristics, including firm 
characteristics, are controlled for. Failure to control for firm characteristics, 
as in most studies as they do not use firm data, will over-estimate the gap. 
Outright discrimination is the sole reason for discrimination and could 
be partially explained by the difference between the role society expects 
of men and that it expects of women, the former being the main bread 
earner, but this argument requires further investigation. 
However, discrimination plays a large role that this analysis suggests, 
since both endowments (lower education and experience) and women’s 
allocation to low paying firms and occupations are indirect discrimination, 
but at the entry point. Even though such entry barriers are justified by 
30
endowments, it is these endowments that constitute what Roemer (1998) 
calls “inequality of opportunity” which are created by “circumstances”, 
such as racial and family background, which the individual should not be 
held accountable for from a social justice perspective. There is thus a need 
for an “equal opportunity” policy to “level off the mounds and troughs 
in the playing field” (Roemer 1998, p.5). Since returns to characteristics 
favor females, concerted efforts to enhancing endowments may reverse 
the gender wage gap. Efforts such as Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) 
given to those parents who send their daughters to school in Upper 
Egypt are currently being applied and, if successful, could be scaled up to 
secondary and post-secondary education levels. CCTs have proven very 
successful in Bangladesh’s Female Secondary School Assistance Project. 
Female enrolment rates have risen from 33% in 1991, the year the project 
was implemented, to 48% within six years of implementation and further 
to 56% in 2005. CCTs have generally also been very successful in Mexico. 
“Oportunidades” in Mexico aimed to break the cross-generational cycles 
of poverty; its success being followed by Brazil’s “Bolsa Familia” in Brazil, 
and other schemes across Latin America.
In as much as the wage gap is explained by both outright discrimination 
and entry barriers, the gap can be narrowed by promoting labor standards, 
especially in the private sector. Men and women are equal under the 
Egyptian constitution. However, an equal pay act,9 ensuring equal pay for 
equal work, and which prohibits discrimination at the entry points into 
the labor market, in job titles, in job ranks and in pay scales, is yet to be 
passed. Egypt ratified the United Nations Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1981, and so is 
committed to ensuring equal treatment of men and women. Nevertheless, 
there is no mention of the prohibition of unequal treatment such as that 
specified, for example, in the Equal Pay Act of the United Kingdom. In 
the UK the Act was passed in 1970, coming into force by the end of 1975. 
The term “pay” is interpreted in a broad sense to include, on top of wages, 
things like holidays, pension rights, company benefits, and some kinds 
of bonuses in addition to “hiring.” Once the law was passed, the judicial 
system began handling cases of complaint of unequal pay, becoming the 
main enforcement mechanism. What is integral to this process is that 
women are educated about their rights as given to them by law, and are 
at the same time granted protection from any possible harassment if they 
actually step forward.
9     The unified labor law of the year 2003 does indeed contain an article on the prohibition of wage discrimina-
tion based on gender (article 35).
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Passing an equal pay act, including prohibition of discrimination at 
labor market entry, in job titles, job ranks, and in pay scales according to 
sex is essential. Yet it is equally important to avoid excessive use of the law 
to impose social entitlements and fringe benefits for women. Such social 
burdens may negatively affect employers’ incentives to create new female 
jobs (cf. Süral, 2009).
Gender inequality is greater when a country’s economic opportunities 
are more limited and households are in greater economic hardship (Nimii, 
2009).  Hence, in agreement with Nimii (2009), along with efforts to 
remove cultural, social, and institutional obstacles through educating 
the public, introducing and enforcing antidiscrimination legislation, 
promoting economic development to generate economic opportunities 
and improving women’s capabilities and access to these opportunities are 
key to greater progress toward gender equality and inclusive growth.
The novel aspect of this study is that it combines both worker and firm 
level data. But a caveat remains, calling for further work. The decomposition 
does not control for selection of labor market participants into the sectors 
and occupations they are currently holding. Whilst the latter is doable with 
the dataset at hand it would still leave the problem of selection bias into 
the labor force, and then into the sector of employment, which is a two-
step selection process. Modeling this stage requires information on the 
non-working (i.e. those outside the labor market). Thus, subsequent work 
will need to combine these data with additional data and use additional 
econometric techniques to tackle these issues.
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